[PROP #42] Fund Market-Making Liquidity for DYM from the Community Pool

TL;DR

This proposal allocates 40,000,000 DYM from the community pool to fund professional market-making for DYM on centralized exchanges, starting with Binance and Bybit. The goal is to lift DYM’s ±2% order-book depth from ~$19K today — 2nd percentile among all Binance listings — to approximate levels of the 25th percentile ranging to exchange-wide median, restoring DYM to a normal, healthy book.

Context

DYM’s order-book liquidity is critically thin. On August 16, 2026, we sampled the live order books of all 481 Binance USDT spot pairs and measured the depth available within ±2% of the mid price:

Metric ±2% depth (bid + ask)
DYM/USDT ~$19K (rank 471 of 481 — 2nd percentile)
Rank 400 (TURBO) ~$40K
Rank 300 (GLM) ~$73K
Median Binance pair ~$108K
25th percentile ~$50K
Celestia (TIA), for comparison ~$390K

In practical terms, DYM has roughly $9–10K of depth per side. A single ~$10K market order moves the price more than 2%. This has direct consequences:

  • Volatility amplification. Small flows produce outsized price swings in both directions.
  • Institutional inaccessibility. No fund or treasury can build or exit a position of meaningful size on the book.
  • Reflexive delisting risk. Exchanges evaluate listings on depth and volume; the thinner the book, the greater the risk to DYM’s most important venue.
  • Poor UX for the community. Every holder pays the spread and slippage that a healthy book would absorb.

Liquidity is arguably the single highest-leverage use of it: every other use of the pool is ultimately settled through this order book. And because the funds are structured as a an option loan rather than a grant, deploying the bulk of the pool here does not permanently spend all of it.

Proposal

  1. Allocate 40,000,000 DYM from the community pool via a community pool spend to fund the necessary liquidity boost. Approximately 3.5M DYM is deliberately left in the pool as a reserve so governance retains capacity for future proposals during the term.

  2. Engage one or two new professional market makers under a token-loan agreement (industry-standard structure: loaned inventory, optional call-option strike aligned with holders, no sell-side discretion beyond quoting obligations).

  3. Bind the engagement to public KPIs, measured and transparent:

    • Maintain ≥ $25K depth per side within ±2% on Binance DYM/USDT ≥ 95% of trading hours;
    • Maintain a bid–ask spread of ≤ 50 bps for ≥ 95% of trading hours;

Motivation

The Market Making allocation is calibrated, not arbitrary. The KPI higher target is set at the exchange-wide median for Binance listings — a realistic step-change from today’s 2nd percentile, sized to what an inventory can credibly support across quoting bands. We are not proposing to get TIA-level depth; we are proposing that DYM’s book simply stop being an outlier.

A loan structure preserves the pool. Unlike incentive emissions or grants, loaned MM inventory is returned at term end. The expected net cost to the pool is limited to option exercises — which only occur if DYM appreciates — and not the headline 40M DYM.

The downside of inaction is asymmetric. A thin book compounds: depth deters volume, low volume deters depth, and listing status is reviewed against both. Restoring depth now, while DYM retains its top-tier listings, is far cheaper than regaining access after losing them.

Governance Votes

  • YES — You support allocating 40,000,000 DYM from the community pool to fund KPI-bound market-making as described.
  • NO — You oppose this allocation.
  • NO WITH VETO — You consider this proposal spam or harmful to the protocol.
  • ABSTAIN — You take no position but contribute to quorum.